Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multiplayer matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games played on graphs with ω-regular objectives. In this paper, we study the algorithmic properties of this concept for such games. We settle the exact complexity of natural decision problems on the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. As a byproduct of our construction, we obtain automata which recognize all the possible outcomes of such strategies.
Introduction
Two-player games played on graphs are central in many applications of computer science. For example, in the synthesis problem for reactive systems, implementations are obtained from winning strategies in games with a ω-regular objectives [19] . To analyze systems composed of several components, two-player games are extended to multi-player games with non zero-sum objectives, i.e. each player has his own objective expressed as a ω-regular specification which is not necessarily adversarial w.r.t. the objectives of the other players. C D A (0, 2) (1, 1) B (1, 1) (1, 2) To analyze multi-player games in normal form (a.k.a. matrix games), concepts like the celebrated Nash equilibrium [16] have been proposed. Another central concept is the notion of * Work supported by ERC Starting Grant inVEST (279499).
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CSL-LICS 2014, July 14-18, 2014, Vienna, Austria. Copyright c 2014 ACM 978-1-4503-2886-9. . . $15.00. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2603088.2603143 dominated strategy [17] . A strategy of a player dominates another one if the outcome of the first strategy is better than the outcome of the second no matter how the other players play. In two-player matrix game of Figure 1 , strategies of player 1 (of player 2 respectively) are given as rows of the matrix (as columns respectively), and the payoffs to be maximized, are given as pairs of integers (the first for player 1 and the second for player 2). Strategy B of player 1 dominates strategy A: no matter how player 2 plays, B provides an outcome which is larger than or equal to the one of A, and if player 2 plays C then the outcome provided by B is strictly larger than the outcome of A. On the other hand, player 2 at first sight has no preference between C and D. But if player 2 knows that player 1 prefers strategy B to strategy A, then he will in turn prefer D to C, and it is then reasonable to predict that (B, D) will be played. This process is called the iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and it is valid under the hypothesis that rationality is common knowledge among the players [1] . Strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strategies are called iteratively admissible strategies.
In [2] , Berwanger initiated a fundamental study of the notion of rational behaviour in infinite duration games played on graph by generalising the notion of strategy dominance and iterated elimination of dominated strategies to that setting. This solution concept is a clear potential alternative to Nash equilibria for those games. As pointed out by Berwanger, one important advantage of admissible strategies is that they are compatible with the sequential nature of games played on graphs: "in any position reachable with an admissible strategy, a strategy is admissible in the sub-game rooted in that position if, and only if, it is the restriction of an admissible strategy in the original game." As a consequence, admissibility does not feature non-credible threats while it is well known that it is the case for Nash equilibria. Nonetheless, the extension of iterated strategy elimination to infinite duration games is challenging as the set of strategies is infinite and may lead to infinite dominance chains. Berwanger's main technical results are as follows: all iteration stages are dominated by admissible strategies, the iteration is non-stagnating, and, under regular objectives, admissible strategies form a regular set. In particular, for the last result, Berwanger suggests a procedure that uses tree automata to represent sets of strategies. The closure of tree automata to projection and Boolean operations naturally provides an algorithm to compute admissible strategies in parity games but this algorithm has non-elementary complexity.
In order to represent a viable alternative to Nash equilibria from a computational point of view, it is fundamental to better understand the complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies in ω-regular games, and see if the non-elementary complexity of the tree-automata based procedure can be avoided. We prove here that this is indeed the case and that iterated elimination of dominated strategies has a computational complexity similar to the one of Nash equilibria. More precisely, we study games with weak Muller and (classical) Muller winning conditions given as circuits. Circuits offer a concise representation of Muller conditions and are closed (while remaining succinct) under Boolean operations. Weak Muller conditions define objectives based on the set of states that occur along a run, they generalize safety and reachability objectives. (Classical) Muller conditions define objectives based on the set of states that appear infinitely often along a run. They generalize Büchi and parity objectives and are canonical representations of ω-regular objectives as every regular language can be accepted by a deterministic Muller automaton. We study the winning coalition problem: given a game and two subsets W, L of players, to determine whether there exists an iteratively admissible profile of strategies that guarantees that (i) all players of W win the game, and (ii) all players of L lose the game (other players may either win or lose). For weak and classical Muller objectives, we provide a procedure in PSPACE, with matching lower-bounds for safety, reachability, and Muller objectives. For Büchi objectives, we provide an algorithm that calls a polynomial number of times an oracle solving parity games (hence this would lead to a polynomial time solution if a polynomial time algorithm is found for parity gamesthe current best known complexity is UP ∩ coUP [12] , although a deterministic subexponential algorithm exists [13] ).
As a byproduct of our constructions, we obtain an automaton on infinite words which recognizes all the possible outcomes of iteratively admissible strategies. Any regular query on this language can be solved using classical automata techniques. As a consequence, we can solve any variant of the winning coalition problem defined above, if this variant can be expressed as such a query. For example, we can solve the model-checking under admissibility problem: given ϕ, an LTL formula [18, 21] , does the outcome of every iteratively admissible profile satisfy ϕ? We show that this problem is complete for the class PSPACE, so it retains the same complexity as the "classical" model-checking problem for this logic. Modelchecking under admissibility is useful to reason about properties that naturally emerge in a system from the interaction of rational agents that purse their own objectives.
Related work Dominance can be expressed in strategy logics [6, 15] but not unbounded iterated dominance. Bounded iterated dominance is expressible but leads to classes of formulas with a nonelementary model-checking algorithm. Other paradigms of rationality have been studied for games on finite graphs, like Nashequilibria [3, 14, 23] or regret minimization [10] . In [14] , the authors build an automaton that recognizes outcomes of Nash equilibria. In turn-based game, finding a Nash equilibrium with a particular payoff is PSPACE-complete for Muller objectives [24] , which is the same complexity we obtain for admissibility. In the case of Büchi objectives, a polynomial algorithm exists for Nash equilibria [23] , while we have a NP ∩ coNP algorithm for admissibility.
In this paper, we concentrate on n-player turn-based perfect information finite game graph with ω-regular objective. This is the basic setting that needs to be studied before looking at richer models, like games with incomplete information [20] , games with quantitative objectives like mean-payoff objectives [25] , or concurrent games [8] . Our results and techniques are clearly prerequisites to study those richer settings.
Organization of the paper We first formalize the setting and notations in Section 2. Safety objectives are solved in Section 3. Muller objectives are solved in Section 4. We conclude by giving other applications of our techniques for Büchi or weak Muller objectives, and to the model-checking under admissibility problem, in Section 8.
A comprehensive example of iterated elimination of dominated strategies is provided in Appendix A.
Due to space constraints, most proofs have been omitted from this paper; they can be found in the full version [5] .
Definitions

Multiplayer Games
Definition 1 (Multiplayer games). A turn-based multiplayer (non zero-sum) game is a tuple G = P, (Vi)i∈P , E, (WINi)i∈P where:
• P is the non-empty and finite set of players;
• V = i∈P Vi and for every i in P , Vi is the finite set of player i's states; • E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges 1 ; we write s → t for (s, t) ∈ E when E is clear from context.
• For every i in P , WINi ⊆ V ω is a winning condition.
A path ρ is a sequence of states (ρj) 0≤j<n with n ∈ N ∪ {∞} s.t. for all j < n−1, ρj → ρj+1. The length |ρ| of the path ρ is n. A history is a finite path and a run is an infinite path. Given a run ρ = (ρj) j∈N and an integer k, we write ρ ≤k the history (ρj) 0≤j<k+1 , that is, the prefix of length k + 1 of ρ. For a history ρ and a (finite or infinite) path ρ , ρ is a prefix of ρ is written ρ ρ . The last state of a history ρ is last(ρ) = ρ |ρ|−1 . The set of states occuring in a path ρ is Occ(ρ) = {s ∈ V | ∃i ∈ N. i < |ρ|, ρi = s}. The set of states occuring infinitely often in a run ρ is Inf(ρ) = {s ∈ V | ∀j ∈ N. ∃i > j, ρi = s}.
A strategy profile for the set of players P ⊆ P is a tuple of strategies, one for each player of P .
Let Si(G) be the set of all strategies of player i in G; we write Si when G is clear from the context. We write S = i∈P Si for the set of all strategy profiles for P , and S−i for the set of strategy profiles for all players but i. If σ−i = (σj) j∈P \{i} ∈ S−i, we write (σi, σ−i) for (σj)j∈P . Similarly, if S is a set of profiles, Si denotes the i-th projection of S, i.e. a set of strategies for player i. A rectangular set of strategy profiles is a set that can be decomposed as a Cartesian product of sets of strategies, one for each player.
A strategy profile σP ∈ S defines a unique outcome from state s: Outs(σP ) is the run ρ = (ρj) j∈N s.t. ρ0 = s and for j ≥ 0, if ρj ∈ Vi, then ρj+1 = σi(ρ ≤j ). If Si is a set of strategies for player i, we write Outs(Si) for {ρ | ∃σi ∈ Si, σ−i ∈ S−i. Outs(σi, σ−i) = ρ}. For a tuple of sets of strategies S P with P ⊆ P , we write Outs(S P ) = i∈P Outs(Si). A strategy σi of player i is said to be winning from state s against a rectangular set S−i ⊆ S−i, if for all σ−i ∈ S−i, Outs(σi, σ−i) ∈ WINi. It is simply said winning from state s if S−i = S−i. For each player i, we write WIN
Winning conditions
Winning conditions for each player are given by accepting sets either on the set of states occurring along the run, or the set of states occurring infinitely often. Particular cases are safety, reachability, and Büchi winning conditions.
• A safety condition is defined by a set Bad i ⊆ V : WINi = (V \ Bad i) ω .
• A reachability condition is defined by a set Good i ⊆ V :
• A Büchi condition is defined by a set Fi ⊆ V : WINi = (V * · Fi) ω .
• A Muller condition is given by a family F of sets of states: WINi = {ρ | Inf(ρ) ∈ F}. For a succinct representation, we assume F is given by a Boolean circuit whose inputs are the states of V , and which evaluates to true on valuation vS : s → 1 if s ∈ S; 0 otherwise; if, and only if, S ∈ F [11] .
• A weak Muller condition is given by a family F of sets of states: WINi = {ρ | Occ(ρ) ∈ F}. We again assume that F is given by a Boolean circuit.
Muller conditions generalize Büchi and other classical conditions such as parity: these can be encoded by a circuit of polynomial size [11] . Note that Muller conditions are prefix-independent: for any finite path h and infinite path ρ , h · ρ ∈ WINi ⇔ ρ ∈ WINi. In two-player zero-sum games with circuit conditions, deciding the winner is PSPACE-complete [11] . Weak Muller conditions generalize safety and reachability.
Admissibility
Definition 3 (Dominance for strategies). Let S = i∈P Si ⊆ S be a rectangular set of strategy profiles. Let σ, σ ∈ Si. Strategy σ very weakly dominates strategy σ with respect to S, written σ S σ , if from all states s:
Strategy σ weakly dominates strategy σ with respect to S, written σ S σ , if σ S σ and ¬(σ S σ). A strategy σ ∈ Si is dominated in S if there exists σ ∈ Si such that σ S σ. A strategy that is not dominated in S is admissible in S. A profile σP such that for all i ∈ P , σi is admissible is called an admissible profile.
The set S * of iteratively admissible strategies is obtained by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies, starting from set S. Formally, we consider the sequence:
Then S * = n∈N S n . When for all player i ∈ P , WINi is ω-regular winning conditions, S * is reached after finitely many iterations and is not empty [2] .
Note that our strategies are defined from all states while in [2] they are defined only for history starting from the initial state. A strategy here can be seen as a tuple of strategies (in the sense of [2] ): one for each state. The set S n we compute is then the cardinal product of admissible strategies from each state. Example 1. Figure 2 (a) presents a safety game that starts in q0. Strategies of player 1 that from q0 go to q4 are losing. Whereas for those that go to q1, there is a strategy of player 2 which helps player 1 to win by playing back to q0. Hence the former are dominated by the later, and so they are eliminated at the first elimination of dominated strategies and do not appear in S 1 1 . In the second step of iteration, if player 2 plays from q1 to q0, he is ensured to win if player 1 plays a strategy of S 1 1 . Therefore the strategies of player 2 that go to q2 are dominated: there are strategies in S 1 1 that make them lose. These latter strategies are therefore removed and do not appear in S 
Decision problems
Winning coalition problem Given a game G and two subsets W, L of players, does there exist an iteratively admissible profile s.t. all
(a) A safety game. Model-checking under admissibility problem Given a game and an LTL [18, 21] formula ψ, does the outcome of every iteratively admissible profile satisfy ψ?
Values
Our algorithms are based on the notion of value of a history. It characterizes whether a player can win (alone) or cannot win (even with the help of other players), restricting the strategies to the ones that have not been eliminated so far. This notion is also a central tool in [2] to characterize admissible strategies. However, [2] gives no practical way to compute values. We will show in this paper, that these are indeed computable.
Definition 4 (Value).
The value of history h for player i after the n-th step of elimination, written Val n i (h), is given by:
• if there is no strategy profile σP in S n whose outcome ρ from last(h) is such that h <|h|−1 · ρ is winning for player i then Val
• if there is a strategy of σi ∈ S n i such that for all strategy profiles σ−i in S n −i , the outcome ρ of (σi, σ−i) from s is such that h <|h|−1 · ρ is winning for player i then Val
The following lemma illustrates a property of values and admissible strategies:
Hence a player that plays according to an admissible strategy cannot go to a state that changes the value of the current history. This condition is not always sufficient, but in the following sections we characterize runs of admissible strategies relying on this notion of value.
Safety objectives
The main result of this section is a PSPACE algorithm for the winning coalition problem in safety games. This is based on a notion of dominance for transitions. We show that by iteratively removing dominated transitions of the game, we describe exactly the set of admissible strategies.
Making explicit the losing players
Let h be an history, the players losing on h are the players in
Proposition 1. For safety winning conditions, the value of a history h only depends on λ(h) and last(h).
We can therefore write Val
We encode the set λ(h) of losing players in the state of the game, at the price of an exponential blowup (in the number of players). The new game has states in 2 P × V and set of transitions (λ, s) → (λ ∪ {i | s ∈ Bad i}, s ) for any λ ⊆ P , if s → s . In this partially unfolded game, the value depends only on the current state, hence is written Val n i (s). For example, the game of Figure 2 (a) is unfolded as the game of Figure 2 (b); states q 0 , . . . , q 4 are states where player 1 has already lost. Now, let us assume for the remainder of this section that the losing players in the game G are explicit.
Dominance of transitions
In the case of safety winning condition, the necessary condition of Lemma 1 becomes sufficient, as shown below. This yields a local notion of dominance, that can be expressed directly on transitions:
Definition 5. We write T n i for the set of transitions s → s ∈ E, such that s is controlled by player i and Val
Such transitions are said to be dominated after the n-th step of elimination. We write T n for the union of all T n i . Definition 6 (Subgame). Let G = P, V, E, WINP be a game and T ⊆ E a set of transitions. If each state s ∈ V has at least one successor by E \ T , the game G \ T = P, V, E \ T, WINP is called a subgame of G. We write Si(G \ T ) the set of strategies
This notion yields a polynomial procedure in the size of the game where losing players are explicit, to compute the set of all iteratively admissible strategies, described in Algorithm 1. The loop is executed at most |E| times, where |E| is the number of transitions in the partially unfolded game.
However, this procedure assumes that the information of which players have already violated their safety condition is encoded in the state. So in the general case, the procedure has a complexity which is exponential in the number of players and polynomial in the number of states of the game. In the case of the winning coalition problem, we can however reduce this complexity to PSPACE.
We now show the correctness of the procedure. We first prove a link between the notions of dominance for strategies and for transitions. Note that since all states s have at least one successor with a value greater or equal to that of s, removing transitions of T Proof. We show that if player i plays a strategy σi admissible w.r.t.
, then the value cannot decrease on a transition , and ρ k ∈ Vi. Let s = σi(ρ ≤k ): Example 2. In Figure 2(a) , initially, q4 has value −1 for player 1, but q0 has value 0 since it is possible to loop in q1 and q0 (if player 2 helps). So, the transition to state q4 is dominated and removed at the first iteration. Then, player 2 has a winning strategy from q1, by always going back to q0, whereas the state q 2 has value 0 for him. Hence q1 → q 2 is removed after this iteration. The fixpoint is obtained at that step, it is represented in Figure 2 (b).
We have seen that removing dominated transitions only removes strictly dominated strategies. The converse is also true, all strategies that remain are not dominated: 
Since there exists a winning strategy σi ∈ S n i from ρ k−1 against strategies of S n −i , then this strategy is still winning at ρ k . Therefore Val n i (ρ k ) = 1, which is a contradiction.
3.3
The winning coalition problem for safety objectives Theorem 1. The winning coalition problem with safety winning conditions is PSPACE-complete. However, if the number of players is fixed, the problem becomes P-complete.
Proof sketch. To decide the winning coalition problem, only the existence of a particular profile is required and the explicit construction of the unfolded graph is not necessary. By guessing a lasso path produced by such a profile, and checking recursively that it does not contain dominated transition, we get PSPACE membership.
The hardness proof is done by encoding instances of QSAT. Instead of detailing the whole construction, we illustrate it on an example in Figure 3 for the following formula µ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3). There are two players x and ¬x for each variable x, plus two players Eve and Adam. The moves of Eve and Adam in the left part of the game determine a valuation: xi is said to be true if Bad i was reached. If a player xi has not yet lost, in the right part of the game, it is better for this player to visit the losing state of Eve than its own. Hence, at the first step of elimination, the edges removed in the unfolded game correspond to the ones going to a state Bad x i if xi is false (and ¬xi if xi is true). At the second step of elimination, Eve should avoid whenever possible, states corresponding to a literal whose valuation is not true, since those states will necessarily lead to Bad ∃ . If the valuation satisfies each clause, then she has the possibility to do so, and one admissible profile is winning for her: so µ is true if, and only if, there is a admissible profile where Eve is winning.
Muller objectives
Our main result for this section is stated in the following theorem: Theorem 2. The winning coalition problem with a Muller condition for each player is PSPACE-complete. The problem is PSPACE-hard even when restricted to two players.
PSPACE-hardness follows from PSPACE-hardness of twoplayer games with Muller conditions [7] .
The idea of the algorithm is to construct a graph representation of the outcomes of admissible profiles. While the construction also
Game Gµ with µ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3(x1 ∨x2 ∨¬x3)∧(¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3). A label y inside a state s denotes that s ∈ Bad y ; a label y below a state s denotes that s ∈ Vy. Note that Eve is abbreviated to ∃ and Adam is abbreviated to ∀.
relies on the notion of value, it is more involved than for safety conditions.
Characterizing outcomes of admissible strategies using the sequence of their value
Proposition 4. For prefix-independent objectives, the value depends only on the last state of the history. The following lemma shows that in terms of the sequence of value for a player, we can distinguish three types of plays that are outcome of admissible strategies.
Hence we write Val
Lemma 2. Let s ∈ V , ρ ∈ Outs(S n ), and i ∈ P .
Now, we characterize outcomes of admissible strategies according to whether they end with value 1, −1, or 0. We do so for each player individually.
Value 1 To be admissible in S n from a state of value 1, a strategy has to be winning against all strategies of S n :
Lemma 3. Let s ∈ V , i ∈ P and ρ ∈ Outs(S n ) be such that ValR
) if, and only if, ρ ∈ WINi.
Value -1 If the run reaches a state of value −1, then, from there, there is no possibility of winning, so any strategy is admissible but the state of value −1 must not have been reached by player i's fault:
Lemma 4. Let s ∈ V , i ∈ P and ρ ∈ Outs(S n ) be such that ValR
) if and only if, ρ k ∈ Vi.
Example 3. As an illustration of Lemmata 3 and 4, consider the left game in Figure 4 . Both runs s0 ·s1 ·s2 ·Good ω 1 and s0 ·s1 ·s2 ·s
are outcomes of non dominated strategies of player 1. Indeed, the play that goes to Good 1 is winning and the value of the path that goes to s3 belongs to 0 * (−1) ω and the value decreases on a transition by player 2.
Value 0 This case is more involved. From a state of value 0, an admissible strategy of player i should allow a winning run for player i with the help of other players. We write H n i for set of states s controlled by a player j = i that have at least two successors that (i) have value 0 or 1 for player i and (ii) have the same value for player j than s after iteration n − 1. Formally, for n ≥ 0, the "Help!"-states of player i are defined as:
These states have the following property.
Lemma 5. Let s ∈ V , i ∈ P and ρ ∈ Outs(S n ) be such that ValR
) if, and only if, ρ ∈ WINi or Inf(ρ) ∩ H n i = ∅ Proof sketch. Let σP ∈ S n such that ρ = Outs(σP ). Assume first that there is only a finite number of visits to H n i and that ρ is not winning for player i. Let k be the greatest index such that ρ k ∈ H n i . After the prefix ρ ≤k no profile of S n can make σi win, since no "Help!"-state is visited. While since Val n i (ρ k ) = 0 there is a strategy profile σ P of S n whose outcome is winning for i from ρ k . Hence the strategy that follows σi until the prefix ρ ≤k and then switches to σ i weakly dominates σi, and σi ∈ S n+1 i . Assume now that either ρ ∈ WINi or there is an infinite number of indexes k such that ρ k ∈ H n i . We define a strategy σi that follows ρ when possible and otherwise plays a non-dominated strategy. Assume that there is a strategy profile σ P ∈ S n such that ρ = Out(σ −i , σ i ) ∈ WINi and ρ = Out(σ −i , σi) / ∈ WINi. We show that there is a profile that makes σi win and σ i lose, so that σ i does not weakly dominate σi.
For instance in the case where ρ continues to follow ρ after it has diverged from ρ , we know it will encounter a "Help!"-state ρ k . From there there is a strategy profile σ (s ) with s = ρ k+1 , and which is winning for σi thanks to the condition Val n i (s ) ≥ 0, and the fact that σi reverts to a non-dominated strategy outside of ρ. This strategy profile can moreover be made losing for σ i from the point where it deviates from ρ, since this deviation is on a state controled by player i and its value for player i is 0. 
Example 4.
As an illustration of Lemma 5, consider the two games in Figure 4 . In the game of Figure 4 (a), a strategy of player 1 that stays in the loop (s0 · s1) forever is weakly dominated. The value of this run is 0 ω and visits no "Help!"-state, since in that game H 0 1 = ∅. Intuitively, the strategy is dominated because it has no chance of winning, while getting out after k steps can be winning if player 2 helps.
However, in the game of Figure 4 (b), the strategy that always chooses s4 from s1 is admissible. The run (s0 · s1 · s4) ω also has value 0 ω , but this time H 0 1 = {s4}, which is visited infinitely often by the loop.
Automata for Out(S n )
Our goal is to obtain an automaton which recognizes Out(S n ). We decompose this construction for each player by noting that:
From the characterization of admissible strategies w.r.t. values of state, we define an automaton
. This construction relies on values at previous iterations. For n > 0, A n i is the automaton where:
• The set of states is V , i.e. the same states as in G;
• From the transitions in G we remove those controlled by player i that decrease his value. Formally:
• A run ρ is accepted by A n i if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
Note that the structure of the automaton is a subgame of G. Since the transitions of G bear no label, the "language" L(A) of an automaton A is here considered to be the set of accepting runs. The following lemma shows the relation between automaton A n i and outcomes of admissible strategies at step n. The following property is a direct consequence of Lemma 6.
As Out(S 0 ) is the set of all runs over G, the previous lemma allows the construction of Out(S n ) by induction, for any n. Note that the size of the automaton accepting Out(S n ) does not grow since all automata in the intersection share the same structure as G (although some edges have been removed). The accepting condition, however, becomes more and more complex. Nonetheless, if for all j ∈ P , WINj is a Muller condition given by a Boolean circuit, the condition of the automaton accepting Out(S n ) is a Boolean combination of such conditions, thus it is expressible by a Boolean circuit, of polynomial size. For example, condition ValR n−1 i (ρ) ∈ 0 * 1 ω can be expressed by a circuit that is the disjunction of all states of value 1 at step n − 1.
Inductive computation of values
Now, we show how to compute the values of the states for all players. Initially, at "iteration −1", all values are assumed to be 0, and
Computing the values at the next iteration relies on solving two-player zero-sum games with objectives based on outcomes of admissible strategies. For example, in order to decide whether a state s has value 1 for player i at iteration 0, i.e. whether Val This idea is extended to subsequent iterations, but the objectives of the games become more complex in order to take into account the previous iterations: the objectives need to enforce that only outcomes of admissible strategies (at previous iterations) are played. Hence the construction relies on the automata A n i built above. Assuming that winning conditions for all players are Muller conditions, this yields a polynomial space algorithm to compute the values.
Characterizing states of value -1
A state s has a value > −1 for player i at step n if there is a strategy profile σP ∈ S n s.t. Outs(σP ) ∈ WINi. This is expressed by: ∃σP ∈ S. σP ∈ S n ∧ Outs(σP ) ∈ WINi. This prompts the definition of the following objective:
Therefore, since the set Outs(S n ) and WINi can both be expressed as the language of an automaton, testing whether a state has value −1 boils down to check emptiness.
Characterizing states of value 1
A state s has value 1 for player i at step n if he has a strategy σi in S n i such that for all strategies σ−i in S n −i , Outs(σi, σ−i) ∈ WINi. This is expressed by the formula:
This prompts the definition of the following objective:
We show that there is indeed a correspondence between this objective Ω Note that we cannot directly obtain a description of Ω n i (s) in term of automata using Lemma 6, since we need to recognize Outs(S n i ). To characterize runs of Outs(S n i ) we will both use a condition on transition similar to the safety case, and a condition on the long run. Recall that T n = ∪i∈P T n i , where:
If a player j = i takes a transition that decreases its value, then we immediately know that player i wins for objective Ω n i by playing an admissible strategy. We thus define:
We also define
and
Objective Ω n i can be further decomposed with respect to C n i and T n .
Proposition 6. Player i, has a winning strategy for Ω n i (s) in G if, and only, if he has one for:
Using the automata
We can now use the acceptance conditions of automata (A 
The set C ≤n i
and WINi are easily definable by an automaton. An automata for Out(S n ) is constructed through an intersection of automata (A m j ) m≤n,j∈P , as shown in Lemma 7. Hence, we now have to construct automata recognizing and Out(S
This construction is also based on the automaton A n i . For this, we show that it can be defined through a combination of Out(S n i , S n−1 −i ) and of outcomes of admissible strategies at the previous iteration. Namely:
The previous lemma provides a recurrence relation to compute the intersection Out(S n i ) ∩ Out(G \ T n ), with base case being all the runs of G.
Bounding the number of iteration phases
We can show that Val 
Algorithm for Muller conditions
The above construction yields procedures to compute the values, and in turn to solve the winning coalition problem. The algorithm works as follow, starting from n = 0 and incrementing it at each loop:
1. compute an automaton representing Out(S n ) with the help of L(A n ), as described in Section 4.2;
2. compute for each player i the objective Θ Proof. This is equivalent to the emptiness of Ψ n i when starting from state s. Again, Ψ n i is a circuit condition on G where edges decreasing the value of their owner are removed. Testing nonemptiness amounts to guessing a lasso path starting from s, and checking that the states visited infinitely often correspond to a set of F. This NP algorithm answers true when Val n i (s) = −1. We therefore have a coNP algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let W, L be the set of players that must win and lose, respectively, in the instance of the winning coalition problem. The winning coalition problem is thus equivalent to the non-emptiness of
over G, which is a Muller condition. This check is done in NP. This however requires the computation of the condition corresponding to Out(S * ), hence of the values for all intermediate iterations before the fix-point. Each iteration means solving a Muller game, which is done in polynomial space. Moreover, by Proposition 7, there are at most |P | · |V | iterations. Thus the overall complexity is in PSPACE.
Büchi objectives
In this section, We assume that each winning condition WINi is given by a Büchi set Fi. A careful analysis of condition Θ n i
shows that it can be reformulated as a parity condition. Hence computing the value of a state boils down to solving two-player parity games. Parity games are known to be in UP ∩ coUP, but the question whether a polynomial algorithm exists for parity games has been open for several years [9, 12] . Our algorithm thus works in polynomial time with call to oracles in NP ∩ coNP, hence is also in NP∩coNP [4] . This idea is the basis for the proof of Theorem 3, which is detailed in the remainder of the section.
Theorem 3. The winning coalition problem with Büchi objectives is in NP ∩ coNP. Moreover, if there exists a polynomial algorithm for solving two-player parity games, then the winning coalition problem with Büchi objectives is in P.
Definition 7.
A parity condition is given by a coloring function χ : V → {0, . . . , M } with M ∈ N. Accepted runs with respect to the coloring functions are the ones where the maximal color visited infinitely often is even: (Inf(χ(ρ)) ) is even} .
Expressing Θi as a parity condition
First note that the acceptance condition of L(A n i ) can be expressed by the following Büchi set, assuming that we remove all the edges that decrease the value of player i:
is accepted by the automaton with the same structure as G and where the Büchi set is V . Since
is recognized by an automaton whose acceptance condition is a conjunction of n × |P | Büchi conditions. By taking a product of the game with an automaton of size n × |P |, a condition Out(S n ) can be expressed as a single Büchi set that we write
We isolate the prefix-independent part of Θ n i by defining
which, by unfolding the recurrence relation of Lemma 9, can be rewritten:
Also remark that the "prefix-dependent" part of Θ n i can be expressed by either removing edges (to avoid sets T 
Solving the winning coalition problem for Büchi objectives
We showed that all objectives encountered in the computation of values boil down to parity objectives. This yields the following proof:
Proof of Theorem 3. By reformulating Θ n i as a parity condition, checking whether the value of a state is 1 amounts to solving a two player game with parity condition. This is known to be in UP ∩ coUP, although suspected to be in P. Similarly, condition Ψ n i is a conjunction of Büchi objectives, hence solving its emptinesswhich means deciding whether the value of a state is −1 -is in P.
Let n0 be the index where the sets of admissible strategies stabilize (we have n0 ≤ |P | · |V |). Let W, L be the set of players that should win and lose, respectively. Solving the winning coalition problem amounts to solving emptiness of
As the conjunction of n0 + |W | Büchi conditions and a coBüchi condition, it can be expressed as a parity condition with 3 colors.
Weak Muller conditions
Assuming that the winning conditions are weak Muller conditions, we can show the following theorem, which generalizes Theorem 1:
Theorem 4. The winning coalition problem for weak Muller conditions is PSPACE-complete. However, if the number of players is fixed, the problem becomes P-complete.
Proof sketch. The core of the argument consists in proving that the value of a history only depends on the set Occ(h) of states that have been visited and on the last state of the history. Then, as in the case of safety conditions, we unfold the game, yielding prefix-independent winning conditions. Therefore we can reuse the techniques of previous section to compute the values. A recursive algorithm taking advantage of the structure of the unfolding limits the complexity and allows a computation in PSPACE.
Model-checking under admissibility
Given a LTL formula φ, the model-checking under admissibility problem is equivalent to the emptiness of Φ = L(¬φ) ∩ Out(S * ). It was proven in [22] that the language L(¬φ) can be represented by a Büchi automaton A ¬φ which can be accessed (i.e. the existence of a transition, whether a state is initial, accepting. . . ) in polynomial space.
Nondeterministically guessing a path (the length of which can be bounded) in the product of A ¬φ and (G, ψ), the automaton with Muller condition for Out(S * (G0)), yields a polynomial space algorithm to solve the model-checking under admissibility problem. Conversely LTL model-checking is PSPACE-hard [21] , hence providing the lower bound:
Theorem 5. The model-checking under admissibility problem is PSPACE-complete.
Conclusion
